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Implications of the Grand Central
Terminal Litigation and Likely Effects on
State and Municipal Government
Programs
HERBERT GLEASON*
I was asked to predict some of the likely effects of the
Grand Central' litigation on state and municipal government
programs. First, the decision may make us complacent. Second,
more aggressive legislation will be enacted to protect landmarks.
Third-a warning rather than a prediction-landmark designations should be made with great care because we certainly are
going to see more litigation in the area.
As to the first point, we should not be complacent as a result of the Penn Central decision. The opinion of the Court is
really a fiat rather than an analysis and, although Justice Brennan appears to deal with every argument that was raised against
the designation of Grand Central Station as a landmark, most of
the time he simply says the railroad's argument has no merit
and goes on. The dissent is disquieting.2 In the judgment of
those three justices, the designation was not a zoning restriction,
where you would have what Justice Holmes called "an average
reciprocity of advantage." Here the restriction was placed, not
area-wide where there would be a multiplicity of owners, but on
a single owner whose property was deemed valuable to the public at large. In spite of making that determination of the public
value which would result from designation, the city government
did not propose to compensate the owner for the burden of designation. Let me just read a few sentences from the beginning of
the dissent because I think it states, as well as I've seen it, what
the problem is and what the problem will be in further cases.
Of the over one million buildings and structures in the city of
New York, appellees [The Landmarks Preservation Commission]
have singled out 400 for designation as official landmarks. The
owner of the building might initially be pleased that his property
has been chosen by a distinguished committee of architects, his-
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torians, and city planners for such a singular distinction. But he
may well discover, as appellant Penn Central Transportation Co.
did here, that the landmark designation imposes upon him a substantial cost, with little or no offsetting benefit except for the
honor of the designation. The question in this case is whether the
cost associated with the city of New York's desire to preserve a
limited number of "landmarks" within its borders must be borne
by all of its taxpayers or whether it can instead be imposed entirely on the owners of the individual properties.'
So considered, the restriction imposed by the Landmarks
Preservation Commission looks to me very much like a taking; it
is akin, if you will, to the taking which occurs from the continued presence of low flying aircraft or from military target practice over an individual's land. In those cases, damages were paid
to the owners to compensate for the taking. I don't think that
the designation of a particular landmark is that different from
the cases in which it has been held that the public must pay for
an advantage which it exacts from an individual landowner. I
think, however, that most of us in this room, are pleased that
the Court did decide otherwise and, of course, it is the decision,
not the dissent, which counts.
I think it was fortunate that the Court in this case did not
lay stress on the transfer of development rights or on the railroad's ability to make use of the property for the purpose for
which the station was originally built. Indeed, it was pointed out
that the railroad was not exploiting the existing building to its
fullest. There was income and profit from operating the building
as it stood. If the Court had relied on the residual profitability
of the property notwithstanding its designation as a landmark,
we would be in real trouble. There are, for example, landmarks
in Boston whose owners acquired them before the existence of
the landmark legislation in 1971,6 and believed they could tear
the buildings down and use them for parking lots. Some of those
buildings, when designated, had no economic use whatsoever.
When that legislation is attacked, as I think it will be, the case
will be brought by somebody who can show that he cannot make
any use whatsoever of his property. Fortunately, we will be able
to say that the Penn Central case did not rest on a finding of
profitable ownership. The Penn Central case, perhaps, stands
for the proposition that restrictions can be placed upon the own-
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ers of designated landmarks without cost to the public regardless of the adverse effect on the owners.
It is because of this possible interpretation of the Penn
Central case that I reach my second point: I do believe that we
will see a proliferation of protective legislation. So the message
is, go to it pell-mell, because the more designations and the more
restrictions that have been imposed when the test cases are
brought, the more likely we will be to be able to defend these
limitations. A court is less likely to listen sympathetically to a
buyer who purchased his property after the existence of
landmark legislation when he knew that people in the community considered his property to be an important architectural or
historic building. He will be less likely to win favor when he
comes forward and complains that an unexpected and unreasonable burden has been placed upon him. I think we are going to
see more legislation, and I think it is urgent that it be enacted
carefully but quickly.
Finally, my third point is that landmark designations in the
future should be made with great care. Designations made with
care are more likely to be sustained and also are more likely to
result in coherent, sensible, and beautiful communities.
I recently had a conversation about Copley Square with the
Director of the Boston Landmarks Commission. We have not yet
designated the Copley Plaza Hotel; it is not a magnificent nor
important historic building, but in the context of Copley Square,
it is hard to imagine how a building could be more appropriate
than that hotel. It virtually covers one side of the Square. We
wondered if designation of the hotel as a landmark would be upheld. I think the chances of its being upheld would be greatly
strengthened if, at the time the hotel is designated as a
landmark, the Commission has also designated Trinity Church
(which nobody is going to tear down), the Boston Public Library, which is on the other side of the Square, and even the
sixty-story John Hancock Mirror, which lends a very important
dimension. I think with such a comprehensive approach, the
chances of upholding the designation of the hotel would be
greatly increased. We would also accomplish a great deal more in
historic preservation and in the preservation of the environment
if we look at the whole setting which a building ornaments. This
double-barrelled approach to the problem not only increases the
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chances of being legally sustained but gets us closer to our ultimate objective-to improve our whole environment.
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6. Id. at 131-33.
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74-79 to 74-793 (1981).
9. The new District of Columbia statute is known as the Historic Landmark and
Historic District Protection Act of 1978. D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-821 (Supp. VII 1980).
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